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Comments
Lawyers and Professionalism: A Commentary
on the Report of the American Bar
Association Commission on
Professionalism
Ronald D. Rotunda *
I.

INTRODUCTION

If we look at what lawyers say about lawyers, a general theme
quickly emerges. Lawyers like-indeed, love-other lawyers and
the law. Louis Nizer, for example, rhapsodized that "law is truth
in action. It is man's highest achievement, because it is the only
weapon he has fashioned whose force rests solely on the sanctity of
reason."' Another New York lawyer, Harrison Tweed, wrote:
I have a high opinion of lawyers. With all their faults, they stack
up well against those in every other occupation or profession.
They are better to work with or play with or fight with or drink
with than most other varieties of mankind. 2

While lawyers may wax eloquently about the legal profession,
the general public wanes eloquently. Artists often capture the public mood; life reflects art. Years ago in London, I purchased a
printed entitled, "The Law Suit." In the center is a cow, representing the law suit. On the right is the plaintiff, pulling her head. On
the left is the defendant, tugging at the tail. And in the center? In
*
Professor of Law, University of Illinois; Reporter for the Illinois State Bar Association Committee on Profsessionalism; B.A., 1967, Harvard College; J.D., 1970, Harvard
Law School. This article was presented on April 7, 1987 at Loyola University School of
Law. The lecture, entitled, "Inquiry Into Contemporary Problems of Legal Ethics: Lawyers and Professionalism," was made possible by a grant from the law firm of Baker and
McKenzie. The author would like to acknowledge consultation with Peter H. Lousberg,
Thomas S. Johnson, and the other members of the Illinois State Bar Association Committee on Professionalism. The author also would like to thank Professors Richard L. Marcus, Steven Lubet, and L. Harold Levinson for reading the manuscript and offering
suggestions. The views expressed are those of the author.
1. L. NIZER, My LIFE IN COURT 523 (1961).

2.

B. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 149 (1952) (quoting Harrison Tweed).
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the center is the barrister, milking the law suit for all that it is
worth.
Poets as well as artists have their fingers on the public pulse.
Carl Sandburg has this to say about lawyers:
When the lawyers are through
What is there left, Bob?
Can a mouse nibble at it
And find enough to fasten a tooth in?
Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does a hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away? 3
Sandburg's perception of lawyers is hardly new. Davy Crockett,
the "King of the Wild Frontier," wrote in his autobiography that
when he was a magistrate, his decisions were fair, because he did
not know "the law," but he knew about "common justice and honesty." 4 To the viewpoint of artists, poets, and backwoodsmen we
can add the position of popular culture. I could fill a whole hour
telling lawyers jokes. Two people searching for grave rubbings
were walking in the famous cemetery in the crowded Wall Street
area. One noticed a tombstone that read: "Here lies a lawyer and
an honest man." He said to his companion, "This cemetery must
really be crowded; they're burying them two to a grave."
Several years ago, then Chief Justice Burger became concerned
that the general public saw lawyers in a bad light, what he called a
"moving away from the principles of professionalism." Moreover,
he thought that the bad public perception had increased in recent
years.' He also thought that lawyers had become less professional
over the years; in particular, he was concerned with legal advertising.6 The ABA president at the time, John Shepherd, generally
3. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: OF OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 142 (1960)
(quoting Carl Sandburg, The Lawyers Know Too Much (1951)).
4. D. CROCKETT, THE LIFE OF DAVID CROCKETT, THE ORIGINAL HUMORIST AND
IRREPRESSIBLE BACKWOODSMAN: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 99-100 (1902):
I was appointed one of the magistrates .... My judgments were never appealed
from, and if they had been, they would have stuck like wax, as I gave my decisions on the principles of common justice and honesty between man and man,
and relied on natural born sense, and not on law learning to guide me; for I had
never read a page in a law book in all my life.
5. ABA COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, "... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERA BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986)
[hereinafter ABA COMMISSION REPORT].
6. When the Supreme Court first ruled that advertising is commercial speech protected by the first amendment, Burger was in the dissent. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
VICE:"
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agreed with the Chief, and an ad hoc Commission on Professionalism came into being. 7 Today, I would like to comment on the report recently produced by that Commission. The product of
nearly two years of work, it is entitled: ".

Service:"
A Blueprint
Professionalism.8
II.

for

the

.

. In the Spirit of Public

Rekindling

of

Lawyer

AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK

In the short time allowed, I will only be able to focus on a few of
the suggestions offered by the ABA Commission on Professionalism. I cannot be exhaustive, and I hope that the Commission
members will forgive me if I fail to discuss all of the proposals, and
spend most of my time on those parts of the report with which I
disagree. Before I begin, a few general comments are in order.
First, a theme reflected in the Commission's work is the belief
that the legal profession is changing and 4this change is for the
worst. The Commission members therefore conclude that professionalism is in decline. I agree the profession is changing, but is
the direction down? The charge of decline is serious, and deserves
to be supported by more than anecdotal analysis. The jokes and
popular view of lawyers that exist today are hardly new. They did
not suddenly spring out, like Pallas Athena from the forehead of
Zeus. Nearly a century ago, Roscoe Pound discussed the "causes
of popular dissatisfaction" with the bar, and listed as a major cause
of that dissatisfaction the "making of the legal profession into a
trade." 9 In 1905, Brandeis concluded that lawyers have "become
largely part of the business world."' 0 Two decades earlier, Bran350, 386 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part). ABA President
Shepherd's charge to the Commission specifically included a study of advertising. ABA
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at v.
7. The group is called a "Commission" rather than a "Committee" because, in the
ABA lexicon, a Commission includes lay members while a Committee does not.
8. The ABA Commission Report is reprinted, inter alia, in 112 F.R.D. 243-312
(1987). All citations are to the original booklet published by the ABA. The ABA Board
of Governors authorized the Commission in December 1984. The Report was published
nearly two years later.
The title of this Report might win an award from THE NEW YORKER magazine as the
mixed metaphor of the month. A blueprint might be used for rebuilding, but not for
rekindling-unless one is going to burn the blueprint. But I prefer to comment on substance, lest some reader focus on my own stylistic faux pas.
9. Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice, 29
A.B.A. Rep. 395, 415 (1906). Complaints against lawyers did not start with Roscoe
Pound. See, e.g., J. HIGGINS, SAMPSON AGAINST THE PHILISTINES OR THE REFORMATION OF LAWSUITS (1805); D. HOFFMAN, FIFTY RESOLUTIONS IN REGARD TO PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT (1836), reprinted in 2 AM. L. SCH. REV. 230 (1906).
10. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION (1913),
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deis remarked, Bryce of England had come to a similar conclusion." The view that legal professionalism is in decline seems to be
a constant theme in the historical literature: every generation appears to observe that in the good old days, things were better.
What new information did the Commission discover in order for it
to conclude that the profession has changed for the worse, and
that, in the past, lawyers were more professional?
The ad hoc Commission was quite concerned that a poll concluded that only seven percent of corporate users of legal services
believe that lawyers are increasing their professionalism, while over
two-thirds see professionalism as decreasing. Similarly, over half
of the state or federal judges surveyed thought lawyer professionalism is decreasing. 1 2 The poll results sound alarming, but what do
they mean? How did the questioners define "professionalism"?
Why did the respondents think that it is decreasing? The Commission answers none of these questions. Instead, we find buried in
the footnotes an acknowledgement that the poll results are unpublished; the sampling was not scientifically chosen; and the survey
was non-random. 3 We aren't even told how the crucial questions
were phrased. Yet this poll is the only specific evidence offered.
What about the good old days, before legal professionalism is
said to have declined? Those were the days when it was popularly
assumed that the bar was immune to the antitrust laws because it
was a "profession," not a "business."' 4 In those good old days,
local bar associations, at the urging of the ABA,' 5 would discipline
lawyers who charged less than the suggested minimum fees.' 6
Lawyers should not compete because law is a profession.
reprinted in G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND
REGULATION 15-16 (1985) [hereinafter HAZARD & RHODE].
11. HAZARD & RHODES, supra note 10, at 16. The Commission,

near the end of its
Report, acknowledges this comment, made by Bryce in 1885 and quoted by Brandeis in
1905. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 55. The Commission fails to explain
why its conclusion that the good old days were better and the decline in professionalism
is recent is consistent with the observations of Brandeis or Bryce.
12. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
13. Id. at 59 n.20.
14. Compare Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935)
with Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
15. In 1974, the ABA House of Delegates removed a sentence of Ethics Canon
("EC") 2-18 which had existed since the ABA adopted the Model Code in 1969. That
sentence read: "Suggested fee schedules and economic reports of state and local bar associations provide some guidance on the subject of reasonable rates." ABA, Annotated
Code of Professional Responsibility 99 (A.B.F. 1979). See also ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC OF LAW PRACTICE, LAWYERS' ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND SOME

21-28 (1959).
See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 777-78 (1975).

BAR ASSOCIATION SOLUTIONS

16.
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"[C]ompetition," the bar claimed in the Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar 17 decision, "is inconsistent with the practice of a profession
because enhancing profit is not the goal of professional activities
. The bar also quietly said, as the Goldfarb decision equally
noted, that lawyers, because of their competition with each other,
were "committing economic suicide."' 9 The Court in Goldfarb, we
may recall, considered these arguments and held that the bar's enforcement of minimum fee schedules violated the antitrust laws.2"
As a wild guess, I suspect that the middle class has preferred the
lower fees that are the legacy of Goldfarb.2 '
Please do not misunderstand me. The ABA Commission on
Professionalism does not advocate a return to the good old days of
minimum fees. Yet, interestingly, it does note that lawyers are ex17. 421 U.S. 773.
18. Id. at 787. Remnants of this theory are still found in portions of the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. EC 2-16 provides that members of the "legal profession" must "receive adequate compensation for services rendered, and reasonable fees
should be charged in appropriate cases to clients able to pay them." EC 2-17 repeats the
refrain: "adequate compensation is necessary in order to enable the lawyer to serve his
client effectively." ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-16, 217 (1982).
19. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787 n.16.
20. Id. at 790-92. Cf M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 152 (1962), in
which Professor Friedman summarizes a similar argument by medical doctors who urge
the need for high fees:
I am not saying that individual members of the medical profession, the leaders
of the medical profession, or the people who are in charge of the Council on
Medical Education and Hospitals deliberately go out of their way to limit entry
in order to raise their own incomes. That is not the way it works. Even when
such people explicitly comment on the desirability of limiting numbers to raise
incomes they will always justify the policy on the grounds that if "too" many
people are let in, this will lower their incomes so that they will be driven to
resort to unethical practices in order to earn a "proper" income. The only way,
they argue, in which ethical practices can be maintained is by keeping people at
a standard of income which is adequate to the merits and needs of the medical
profession. I must confess that this has always seemed to me objectionable on
both ethical and factual grounds. It is extraordinary that leaders of medicine
should proclaim publicly that they and their colleagues must be paid to be ethical. And if it were so, I doubt that the price would have any limit. There seems
little correlation between poverty and honesty. One would rather expect the
opposite; dishonesty may not always pay but surely it sometimes does.
21. The empirical evidence available thus far shows that legal advertising has tended
to lower fees (but not quality of work performed) because of increased competition. See,
e.g., Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding ConstitutionalRights,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 166-69 (1984). Major, established law firms now engage in extensive
legal advertising. Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, in New York, paid $5,000 a month in late
1985 when it hired a public relations firm. Gray, More Lawyers Reluctantly Adopt
Strange New Practice-Marketing,Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1987, at 19, col. 4 (Midwest ed.).
Advertising has also improved the public image of lawyers. Middleton, Ads Pay Off-In
Image And Income, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
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periencing "more competition,"22 that nonetheless the supply of
lawyers is increasing dramatically,23 that the average lawyer does
not earn nearly as much as the most highly paid lawyers,2 4 and
that more corporations are reducing the demand 25for outside law
firms by using in-house counsel to cut legal costs.
The Commission specifically objects to what it calls "exorbitant
beginning salaries" paid to young lawyers at Wall Street Firms,
resulting in "additional economic pressure on those firms, the individuals working there, and on firms that are competitive with
them."' 26 Forgive me if I am confused. Wall Street firms, I suspect, pay those exorbitant starting salaries because that's what it
takes to draw enough talented and hardworking people to the metropolitan jungle we call New York. If all the Wall Street firms
became more "professional" and paid less to their new associates,
what would happen to the money that otherwise would have gone
to the young associates? The Commission Report does not suggest
a rebate of legal fees to the corporate clients; law firms, after all,
are not eleemosynary institutions. And if they are, large corporate
clients are not typical recipients of charity. Perhaps the money
would go to the partners. If so, I don't understand why that result
is more "professional" than the present system.27
22.

ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.

23. Id.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 9. It is said of the ABA that "[p]ower does not even flow from the top
down, it just stays at the top." Drew, The Rule of Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1973, § 6
(Magazine), at 16. Moreover, popular commentators charge that the ABA's social conscience diminishes, if not disappears, when a proposed course of action suggests lawyer's
incomes, or the interest of corporate clients, will be adversely affected. Id. at 16, 58.
Academics, as well, have made somewhat similar observations. See, e.g., Morgan, The
Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977); Rhode,
Why the ABA Bothers. A Functional Perspective on ProfessionalCodes, 59 TEX. L. REV.
689 (1981).
26. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 &n.*. Higher starting salaries
have not caused any overabundance of supply. Major law firms have complained that
"they can't hire lawyers fast enough to keep up with the crush of work." Even with the
high salaries, the major law firms have more than survived: " 'These are boom times for
the legal community,' says Ed Kaufman, a partner with Los Angeles-based Irell &
Manella, which posted revenue of $40 million last year, up 20% from 1985." Gray, Law
Firms' Big Fee Hikes Reflect Higher Pay and Booming Business, Wall St. J., Mar. 19,
1987, at 35, col. 4 (Midwest ed.).
27. My Wall Street friends tell me that a major reason for the high starting salaries
there is that the law firms must compete with the investment bankers. A young investment banker out of school only two or three years can earn between $100,000 to 165,000
per year. The young lawyer, therefore, often considers a career in investment banking
instead of law. The investment bankers can earn so much because federal regulation, the
Glass-Steagall Act, limits outside competition. In order to allow for competition, various
efforts are now being made to modify the Glass-Steagall Act, Banking Act of 1933, Pub.

1987]

Commentary on the ABA Report on Professionalism

1155

In the good old days, before professionalism had declined, the
organized bar sought to prohibit efforts by unions to help their
members find legal services. The Commission notes the Supreme
Court decision that invalidated such prohibitions, Brotherhood of
RailroadTrainmen v. Virginia,28 but then appears to favor the view
of the dissent, which the Commission quotes favorably. The dissent in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen disparaged the majority
position because it "relegates the practice of law to the level of a
commercial enterprise. "29 The majority, utilizing a freedom of association rationale, allowed unions to recommend to their members those lawyers willing to take the workers' Federal Employers'
Liability Act cases.3 ° Is this decision another weight on the scale
against professionalism? 3'
In the good old days, there was also no advertising of lawyers'
services. As a consequence, the lay public-not the corporate or
other institutional users of legal fees, but the great middle classoften greatly over-estimated the cost of various legal tasks, such as
L. No. 66-89, 48 Stat. 184 (1933), codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. 2, 3, and 6.
More competition should reduce prices. See Sherman, C.E.O. 'sTake On the Investment
Bankers, Fortune Mag., April 27, 1987, at 57, col. 3. Regarding the Glass-Steagall Act,
see, Hacker & Rotunda, The SEC's Ectoplasmic Theory of an Issuer as Applied to Educational and Charitable Institutions,Bank Trustees, and Other Exempt Issuers, 65 CALIF. L.
REV. 1181 (1977).
28. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
29. Id. at 9 (Clark, J.,joined by Harlan, J., dissenting), cited with approval in ABA
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
30. See generally, 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, AND J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 20.41, 20.54 (1986) [hereinafter
R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, AND J. YOUNG].
31. The ABA Commission does not advocate the removal of ethical roadblocks to the
establishment of "Legal Maintenance Organizations" ("LMO's"), the legal equivalent of
Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMO's"). Note that medical doctors have joined
and marketed HMO's without losing their status as professionals. In fact, the approving
reference to the Brotherhoodof Railroad Trainmen dissent, ABA Commission Report at
5, suggests that the various members of the Commission may embrace restrictions like
those in the ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103 (1982).
See generally Morrison, Bar Ethics. Barrierto the Consumer, TRIAL, Mar.-Apr. 1975, at
14. The increase in the number of HMO's have caused a drop in expenses. A "strong
dose of competition works wonders." Gannes, Strong Medicinefor Health Bills, Fortune
Mag., Apr. 13, 1987, at 70, 71, col. 2. We should lower lawyers' fees and increase access
to legal services through competition, not be preaching against greed. See supra note 27.
People who use lawyers, the statistics tell us, tend to like lawyers more than the people
who have never used them. The ABA Commission acknowledged that fact. ABA Commission Report at 3 ("clients generally think well of their own lawyers."). See also B.
CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC:

THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL

SURVEY 264 (A.B.F. 1977). Thus, to the extent that bar rules that discourage
"L.M.O.'s" are lifted, providing the general public with more access to legal services, the
general public attitude about lawyers should rise. Ironically, however, the Commission
does not advocate the removal of such barriers.
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drawing up a simple will, or advising on the effects of an installment sales contract.32 The Supreme Court eventually allowed advertising and rejected the argument that lawyers are "above
trade." 33 Some argue that it is undignified for a lawyer to advertise; the Commission noted that many lawyers are concerned about
undignified ads.34 Bankers, however, have advertised for a long
time, and we do not think less of that profession. (In fact, a few
years ago, my local bank gave me a complete set of flatware for
opening a savings account; the status of bankers did not therefore
diminish in my view.) In any event, the evidence shows that advertising has lowered fees and helped clients. 35 Isn't that what a profession (as opposed to a cartel) is supposed to do?
Similarly, in the good old days, it was unethical for an ACLU
attorney to write a letter to a prospective client in order to advise
her of her legal rights and to offer free legal assistance. The
Supreme Court also invalidated that effort of the South Carolina
State Bar to protect its profession. 36

In short, the Commission has not demonstrated that professionalism has, in fact, declined. Justin Stanley, the chairman of the
Commission, has said that it was "fairly easy" to conclude that
there has been a decline in professionalism.37 Perhaps it was too
easy. I suspect the lay public would not prefer the good old days.
I am no Pollyanna, but I do think that matters are getting better,
not worse. We always have had lawyers who cheat, who commingle client trust funds, who aid their clients' securities violations by
drafting documents that knowingly fail to disclose material facts. 38
32. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 370 n.22 (1977).
33. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
34. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 27. To its credit, the Commission
notes, "it seems probable that it is principally lawyers-not clients-who are concerned
about the style and message of certain legal advertising." Of course, as the Commission
correctly observes, ads that are truly misleading or dishonest should be forbidden.
35. See, e.g., Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual
ConstitutionalRights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 166-69 (1984). See also supra note 28.
36. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). The Commission acknowledges the case,
though it erroneously identifies the lawyer as working for the NAACP. See ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 6. Contrast Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447
(1978), where the in-person, face to face solicitation involved overreaching by the disciplined lawyer. See generally 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG, supra note 30,
§ 20.31 (1986).
37. Professionalism, Pragmatists or Predators?, 75 ILL. B.J. 420 (R. Rotunda ed.
1987) (quoting J.Stanley, chair, ABA Commission on Professionalism).
38. See, e.g., Power, PartnersSue Ivan Boesky, Related Firms, Wall St. J., Mar. 23,
1987, at 3, col. 4 (Midwest ed.) (major law firm, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, sued by institutional investors and others for preparing prospectus and other documents which failed to disclose material facts).
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Whenever we have a large enough barrel of apples, it is a statistical
certainty that some will be bad. What is encouraging is that lawyers are less reluctant to sue other lawyers when meritorious cases
develop; fortunately, the conspiracy of silence that has long been
associated with medical malpractice cases has been less prevalent
in legal malpractice cases.3 9 In addition, many states have now
revamped, revitalized, and modernized their disciplinary
machinery.4"
The organized bar and the general public are also now more
aware of problems in the legal system than in the past. A lawyer
recently testified before the Illinois State Bar Association Committee on Professionalism that the threat of legal malpractice has
made him more careful, forcing him to keep up on recent changes
in the law.4 Successful malpractice cases against lawyers do tend
to get the attention of other lawyers. That's good. That is not a
sign of decay, but renewal-not decline, but advance. The legal
system is cleaning up the problems of incompetence. Times have
changed, but in terms of promoting professionalism, the times have
gotten better, not worse. Much still needs to be done, of course,
but the movement is in the right direction.4 2
My last point in this overview, before we consider some of the
specific recommendations, relates to that amorphous concept "professionalism." This vague term certainly has favorable connotations, but what does it mean? The Commission appears to justify
39. E.g., Gray, Courting Trouble. A Lawyer Who Sues Other Lawyers Wins Cases But
Few Friends, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1986, at 1, col. I (Midwest ed.); Hill, The Bar at Bay,
Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (Midwest ed.).
Contrast G.B. SHAW, THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA (1911) (preface), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SHAW: COMPLETE PLAYS WITH PREFACES 1, 8 (1962): "[E]very doctor will allow a colleague to decimate a whole countryside sooner than violate the bond of
professional etiquette by giving him away."
40. See, e.g., DuMouchel, The Attorney Grievance Commission: Update, 60 MICH.
BAR. J. 734 (198 1); Gray, Standardsfor Lawyer Disciplineand Disability Proceedingsand
the Evaluation of Lawyer DisciplineSystems, I I CAP. U.L. REV. 529 (1982); Outcault &
Peterson, Lawyer Discipline and Professional Standards in California: Progress and
Problems, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 675 (1973); Vernon, Illinois Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: A New Blueprintfor Disciplinary Enforcement, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 365 (1981).
41. Testimony before ISBA Committee on Professionalism, Open Hearing of Mar.
13, 1987, held in Champaign, IL. See also Comment, Attorney ProfessionalResponsibility. Competence Through MalpracticeLiability, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 633(1982).
42. Another example of the movement in the right direction: it was not until 1956
that the ABA eliminated the requirement that the applicant disclose his or her race in the
application for membership. See 81 A.B.A. Rep. 211 (1956). The race disclosure requirement had effectively excluded blacks. See RAUH, The Lawyer's Obligation to the Public

Interest, in

THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE:

(ABA 1985).

AN IDEA REVISITED

9
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various advantages for the members of the legal profession merely
by defining "profession" to include those advantages.
The Commission first offers a definition proposed by Roscoe
Pound over thirty years ago. A profession is a group "pursuing a
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service-no
less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood."' 43 I have no quarrel with this particular definition because
it merely defines a term: it does not purport to be a theory of how
society should deal with a profession.
Following this definition, however, the Commission offers another. What distinguishes a "profession" from other occupations?
Well, says the Commission, a mere occupation becomes a profession when its members have "special privileges," such as "exclusive licensing" and "self-regulation."" Why should a profession
have such special privileges? The Commission's answer is easy: by
definition it has them. The Commission has taken some very serious issues debated in the literature" and in the case law 46 and dismissed them by using a definition to substitute for a theory-a
definition, by the way, which could just as equally apply to a cartel
rather than the learned profession of the law.
That is why
George Bernard Shaw said that professions are "conspiracies
43. R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953),
quoted in ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 10. The language became part of
the title in the Commission Report. Judge Grady brought the definition to the attention
of the Commission. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 10 & n.58.
44. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 10 (definition of Professor Eliot
Freidson of New York University). Regarding the importance of language and "mere
words," see generally R. ROTUNDA, THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE (U. of Iowa Press

1986).
45. For example, regarding self-regulation, the ABA Standards for Lawyer Discipline
and Disability Proceedings § 3.4 (1979), propose that a third of the members of the hearing panel be nonlawyers. To increase public accountability, others have proposed that a
majority or more of the members of the agency regulating lawyers be laypeople. See, e.g.,
J. LIEBERMAN, THE TYRANNY OF THE EXPERTS: How PROFESSIONALS ARE CLOSING
THE OPEN SOCIETY 14-17 (1980); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 46 (1986).
Regarding unauthorized practice, see Cavanagh & Rhode, The UnauthorizedPractice of
Law and Pro se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976); Christensen,

The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really make Good Neighbors-Or
Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159; Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibi-

tions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).
46. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (certain unauthorized practice
restrictions invalidated).
47. See generally Rotunda, The Word "Profession" Is Only a Label, 4 LEARNING &
THE LAW 16 (ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar (1977)).
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against the laity." 4 8
So much for this overview. Let us now consider some of the
Commission's specific proposals.4 9

III.

LITIGATION

The Commission, after several times condemning what it calls
the "scorched-earth" strategy of litigation 5 0 offers several recommendations to address the problem. While Justin Stanley, the
chairman of the Commission, has said that recommendations in
the nature of platitudes are useless,5" several of the proposals fall in
that category. For example, the Commission recommends that the
"[b]ar should place increasing emphasis on the role of lawyers as
officers of the court, or more broadly, as officers of the system of
justice."5 2 Clients, also, should "appreciate the importance to society of maintaining the system of justice. ' 53 I doubt anyone disagrees with these recommendations. We also favor motherhood
and the flag.
The Commission tells us that there is too much litigation consuming "vast amounts of time and money."'5 4 Yet the Commission
is also aware that various expert studies have concluded that a litigation explosion simply may not exist.55 In fact, the "number of
disputes actually litigated in the United States does not appear to
be rising much faster than the population as a whole." ' 56 The in48.

G. B.

SHAW,

DOCTOR'S DILEMMA (preface) (1911), reprinted in 1 BERNARD

SHAW: COMPLETE PLAYS WITH PREFACES 9

49.

50.
51.

(1962).

I do not purport to be exhaustive.
ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 3, 51.

Professionals, Pragmatistsor Predators? 75 ILL. B.J. 420 (R. Rotunda ed. 1987)

(quoting J. Stanley, Chair, ABA Commission on Professionalism).
52. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 3. See also id. at 3 ("scorched-earth" strategy of litigation"); Id. at 41
("filing of frivolous motions and complaints... and taking unwarranted appeals gluts our
system of justice"); id. ("litigation today frequently resembles the dance marathons of the
1930's .. ").
55. Id. at 39 n.*
56. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practiceand Training, 33 J. LEG. EDUC. 570, 571
(1983) (emphasis omitted). Bok adds: "Our courts may seem crowded, since we have
relatively few judges compared with many industrial nations. Nevertheless, our volume
of litigated cases is not demonstrably larger in relation to our total population than that
of other western nations." Id. (emphasis in original). See generally Galanter, Reading
the Landscapeof Disputes.- What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983)[hereinafter
Galanter]. The "litigation rate in the 1970's is about half of what it was during the early
nineteenth century." Id. at 38. See also id. at 61-69.
In the federal courts, for example, from 1960 to 1980, the number of cases filed increased (from 0.5 per thousand, to 0.9 per thousand), but the average number of cases per

1160

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 18

creased talk of the litigation crisis may tell us more about the public relations expertise of insurance companies than anything else."
Nonetheless, the Commission members assert that the litigation
crisis exists, and that assumption forms of basis of several of their
recommendations.
The Commission tells us that litigation is so expensive that
plaintiffs presenting just claims often settle for too little, because
they cannot afford to litigate them; yet defendants also improperly
federal judge stayed about the same. And, from 1900 to 1980, the length of civil cases
shortened, from about 3.5 years in 1900 to 1.16 years in 1980. Clark, Adjudication to
Administration: A StatisticalAnalysis of FederalDistrictCourts in the Twentieth Century,
55 So. CALIF. L. REV. 65, 81-85 (1981).
In 1960 Justice Charles Breitel, then of the New York Appellate Division, complained
of the "decline in litigation ... ," stating there "are fewer contract cases. There are fewer
equity cases .... It is the public that is the loser in the decline of the litigation process and
the litigation bar." Breitel, The Quandaryin Litigation, 25 Mo. L. REV. 225, 232 (1960).
The "litigation rate in the 1970's is about half of what it was during the early nineteenth century." Galanter, supra, at 38.
Chief Justice Burger and others have complained about the "litigation explosion." See,
e.g., Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975); Burger, Isn't
There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982); Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little
Justice: An Argument for Delegalizing America, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1979, at 25.
But Professor Galanter concludes, after extensive examination of the statistics and comparison with the litigation experience in other countries, that the literature complaining
about the so-called litigation explosion shows "a strong admixture of naive speculation
and undocumented assertion." Galanter, supra at 62. He states:
I have argued that the hyperlexis reading of the dispute landscape displays the
weakness of contemporary legal scholarship and policy analysis. We have seen
the announcement of general conclusions relevant to policy on the basis of very
casual scholarly activity. The information base was thin and spotty; theories
were put forward without serious examination of whether they fit the facts;
values and preconceptions were left unarticulated. Portentous pronouncements
were made by established dignitaries and published in learned journals. Could
one imagine public health specialists or poultry breeders conjuring up epidemics
and cures with such cavalier disregard of the incompleteness of the data and the
untested nature of the theory? If the profession's claim to expertise in such
matters as disputes and litigation is to be taken seriously, it will need to adopt
ground rules to require more respectful touching of the data bases. It will have
to recognize that the collection of data and the development of coherent and
tested theories for interpreting it are an inescapable collective responsibility of a
group that purports to proffer expert opinions about the arrangements of public
life. The career of the "litigation explosion" literature does not offer much reassurance that the legal profession and legal education are prepared to exercise
such responsibility.
Id. at 71.
57. See, e.g., Hunter & Angoff, Tort-Reform Legislation. . . Ought to Reduce Premium, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1987, at 20, col. 3 (Midwest ed.) (insurance companies claim
that laws which limit tort victims compensation will not result in lower premiums, thus
contradicting claims of insurance industry's public relations arm); Tort Tales: Old Stories
Never Die, Nat'l Law J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 39, col. I (in spite of growing body of statistical
research, insurance companies and others publicize anecdotes of outrageous tort verdicts;
these war stories are false).
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settle unjust claims for the same reason.5 8 Yet the Commission
also urges more efforts at settlement.5 9 While the Commission is
concerned about the alleged increase in litigation, it also recommends that lawyers take on morepro bono activities, 6° although the
result will be more pro bono litigation. The Commission says that
"as a society [we] are 'overlawed',' 6 and perhaps overlawyered, 62
but the middle class is under represented. 63 Yet more representation for the middle class may lead to more litigation. These positions may appear a little inconsistent, but they assure that all
readers of the Commission Report will agree with it-at least half
the time.
In order to reduce the litigation crisis that the Commission Report postulates, the Commission urges litigants to place more emphasis on "alternative methods of dispute resolution." Law
schools, we are told, should instruct in this area, 64 and bar associations should support expanded use of such alternative methods."
The Commission is pleased that at least two-thirds of the law
schools now offer courses in negotiation and alternative dispute
resolution.66 Lawyers and their clients should realize, advises the
ABA Commission, that "making the first move" toward settlement
is not a sign of weakness.67
The Commission members apparently did not realize that when
lawyers and law professors teach negotiation, it is standard to instruct the negotiator to "induce [the] opponent to make the first
offer." ' 68 Although the ABA Commission says that no one should
be reluctant to make the first move toward settlement, an ABA
sponsored text advises that the "party who made [the] first offer
will be at a disadvantage ... 69 Maybe it's a good thing that not
58.

ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 39. In 40% of the personal injury

tort lawsuits filed in 1985 (866,000 suits), the jury awarded nothing; this percentage has
not fluctuated more than three points in the last twenty-five years. Herman, MillionDollar Verdicts and Other Rarities, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1987, at 26, col. 3 (Midwest ed.).
59. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5,at 40.
60. Id. at 47.
61. Id. at 32.
62. Id. at 51.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 12, 18.
65. Id. at 13, 38.
66. Id. at 40 n.**.
67. Id. at 40.
68. C. CRAVER, FUNDAMENTALS OF EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATING 12 (ALIABA Professional Development Series 1985).
69. Id.
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everyone takes a negotiation course: if all lawyers did, no one
would be left to make the first move.
Empirical studies show that lawyers usually are not the ones
pushing to litigate. It is often the case that the lawyers for both
sides urge settlement; it is the clients who refuse to compromise.7 v
At other times, as Yale University Law Professor Owen Fiss has
noted, the pressure to settle leads to unjust results; settlement is
not always a good thing.7 1
The Commission also specifically recommends use of arbitration
in order to decrease the amount of litigation. We must keep in
mind that arbitration has its own pitfalls. As one commentator has
remarked, "arbitrators are, well, arbitrary. ' '7 2 Arbitration does not
provide the litigant with the protection of rules of discovery, rules
of evidence, findings of fact, or conclusions of law.7 3 Arbitrators,
70. B. CURRAN, supra note 31, at 229 (survey showing that 87% of the respondents
agreed with the following statement: "Lawyers try hard to solve their client's problems
without having to go to court"; and 80% agreed with the following statement: "Most
lawyers' work consists of helping clients arrange their affairs so as to avoid future
problems and disagreements.").
Compare, for example, American lawyers to Australian lawyers. "In Australia, 19%
of the instances in which a lawyer was consulted in a grievance did not mature into a
dispute. The U.S. figure is 24%. In other words, American lawyers are more likely to
dampen disputes." Galenter, supra note 56, at 60. Americans may appear to be more
likely tofile lawsuits than Australians, apparently because filing is culturally more a part
of the settlement process. Id. Yet Australians are substantially more likely to complain
of troubles than are their U.S. counterparts and somewhat more likely to engage in an
actual dispute. Fitzgerald, Grievances, Disputes and Outcomes.- A Comparison of Australia and the United States, 1 LAW IN CONTEXT 15, 25 (1983).
Of course, on a more general level, the Commission is correct: law schools should also
strive to reevaluate their curriculum so as to improve legal education. See generally
Kelly, Educationfor Lawyer Competency: A Proposalfor CurricularReform, 18 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 607 (1983).
71. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Fiss, 11 LITIGATION 3 (Fall
1984).
72. Scheibla, Big Decision, Can You Sue a Broker?, Barron's, Mar. 2, 1987, at 16, col.
3.
For a thorough study and critique of Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR"), including a case study of the Neighborhood Justice Center in Kansas City, see C. HARRINGAND
THE
IDEOLOGY
SHADOW
JUSTICE:
TON,
ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (Greenwood Press 1985).

INSTITUTIONALIZATION

OF

73. Scheibla, supra note 72, at 16, col 3. Even a strong proponent of securities arbitration admits that "the Uniform Code of Arbitration should be amended to give customers a role in selecting their arbitrators"; the term "public arbitrator" should be "redefined
to exclude lawyers and others who work for firms that serve the securities industry as
advisers"; and the Uniform Code of Arbitration "must ensure that arbitrators make a
good-faith effort to follow federal law when customers raise federal statutory claims. Arbitrators should be required to sign a sworn statement to this effect when they submit
their final decision." Shell, Keep Broker-ClientDisputes Out of Court, Wall St. J., Mar. 3,
1987, at 34, col. 3 (Midwest ed.). See also Note, Federal and State Securities Claims:
Litigation or Arbitration, 61 WASH. L. REV. 245, 260-61 (1986) (securities arbitration
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unlike judges, are discouraged from giving reasons for their decisions. The President of the American Arbitration Association candidly advised, "Written opinions can be dangerous because they
identify targets for the losing party to attack." 74 Arbitration is like
sausage: if we knew how it was made, we'd be much less confident
of the results.
The Supreme Court, as you may know, recently held that broker-dealers can force their customers who have signed predispute
arbitration agreements to arbitrate securities fraud claims brought
under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5 and Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934." 5 The broker-dealer insists on arbitration, while the customer refuses. The
broker-dealer in that case knows of the advantages of arbitration.
In a securities arbitration, often the chairperson is another stockbroker. We should not be surprised if a broker-dealer is not the
most detached, neutral observer to judge his fellow broker-dealer.76
The broker-dealer who is the arbitrator in one case may well be the
respondent in the next case. So-called independent arbitrators on
the securities arbitration panel often include practicing lawyers
who represent other broker-dealers and have a similar mind-set.77
It is not surprising that the defendant seeks compulsory arbitration
because the defendant views that as being in its best interest. Nor
is it surprising that plaintiffs have different interests. What is surprising is the ABA Commission's failure to acknowledge this difference in interests.78
does not protect investors and must be "substantially improved"); Note, Arbitrabilityof
Claims Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548 (many
flaws exist in securities arbitration; these flaws severely hurt investors).
Regarding the importance and advantage of civil jury trials, see Lousberg, On Keeping
the Civil Jury Trial, 43 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 344 (1968).
74. Scheibla, supra note 72, at p. 33, col. 4. Accord R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 26 (1980).
75. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
76. Scheibla, supra note 72, at 16, col. 3. See also Chemerinsky, Protecting Lawyers
from their Profession: Redefining the Lawyer's Role, 5 J. OF LEGAL PROF. 31, 34 (1980)
(lawyers likely to derive their personal beliefs from their professional behavior; thus,
when lawyers represent clients' positions, eventually lawyers adopt clients' attitudes). Cf
Rotunda, The Combination of Functions in Administrative Actions: An Examination of
European Alternatives 40 FORD. L. REV. 101, 102-03 (1971).
77. Scheibla, supra note 72, at 16, col. 3. See also Merit Insurance Co. v. Leatherby
Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983) (courts reluctant to
set aside arbitration even when arbitrators are in conflict of interest position).
78. It is often in the interest of the defendant to delay if liability is likely (or possible),
and if the court provides no prejudgment interest. Yet the Commission badly asserts:
"Both plaintiffs and defendants have a substantial interest in securing a quick, inexpensive and certain resolution." ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
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In an effort to reduce expensive litigation, some courts now require the parties to engage in so-called "mandatory" arbitration,
followed by a full trial if either party objects to the arbitration
award. At this trial, evidence of the arbitration and the results are
inadmissible.79 The hope, apparently, is that this pre-litigation
hurdle will encourage settlement. Although these efforts are wellintentioned, they may well result in more expense, not less, and
increased delay, not expedition. This new procedure requires the
parties to cross an extra hurdle before they reach trial, when the
jury verdict really is mandatory and not advisory. Even if the extra hurdle produces more settlements, the results may nevertheless
be unjust.8"
The Commission praises those law schools that now offer
courses in alternative dispute resolution and negotiation.8" To
learn of alternative remedies is, of course, useful, but let us not be
naive. Teaching future lawyers about negotiation, settlement, and
arbitration will not make them less litigious. We law professors
don't have that much power to change human nature. The Commission exaggerates our influence. A recent study of German legal
ethics suggested that the German training of lawyers appeared to
promote a system much less litigious than our own. Yet appearances were deceiving. When one looked below the surface, the
study demonstrated that the German legal system was just as litigious as the system here. Germany, like the United States, turns out
an enormous number of lawyers each year, though the numbers
may be deceiving because Germany, unlike the United States, distinguishes between advocacy and advice. German law heavily regulates fees in an effort to encourage settlement, but, in practice,
such regulation has increased lawyer fees and has delayed settlement, because the German lawyers often postpone settlement until
the eleventh hour in order to increase their regulated fees. Lawyers in Germany, like lawyers in this country, commonly believe
that their legal opponents engage in frivolous motions and frivolous appeals, and in delaying actions. 2 We may look wistfully to
79.
80.

See, e.g., 15 BAR REPORT 5 (Wash. D.C. Bar, Feb.-Mar. 1987).
ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 40 n.**.

81. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984); Fiss, II LITIGATION 3
(Fall 1984).
82. Luban, The Sources of Legal Ethics: A German-American Comparison of Law-

yers' ProfessionalDuties, 48 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 245, 281, 284 (1984).
The Commission appears to have been influenced by Derek Bok's beliefs that the
American legal system compares unfavorably with other systems. See generally Bok, A
Flawed System, 85 HARV. MAG. 38 (May - June 1983). Bok's conclusions, however, rest
on several fatal assumptions. See, e.g., Hay, Law, Lawyers, and Legal Education: The
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Europe, but when we look more closely, we see ourselves in a
mirror.83
The Commission also urges trial judges to take a more active
role in litigation in order to move it along. The Commission
frankly concedes that when discretion is exercised, discretion will
be abused. But we are told not to worry because the "reviewing
courts should provide whatever counterbalance is needed."' 84 It is
unfortunate that the Commission is not more specific, and does not
explain how a reviewing court should walk this fine line between
deference to the trial court's discretion, and reversal of the trial
court. Nonetheless, we all should applaud any efforts to move
cases along, and reduce delay. In a few minutes I shall offer some
of my own suggestions. But first, let us consider a more specific
recommendation of the Commission.
The Commission urges judges to "impose sanctions for abuse of
the litigation process. ' s5 Specifically, the Commission endorses
Rule 11 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.86 Everyone hopefully now recognizes that lawyers should not file frivolous
motions. Gone are the days when a respected lawyer like Bruce
Bromley, who now has a chair named after him at Harvard Law
School, 7 bragged:
Now I was born, I think, to be a protractor ....

I quickly real-

ized in my early days at the bar that I could take the simplest
antitrust case that the Department of Justice Antitrust Chief
could think of and protract it for the defense almost to infinity
.... If you will look at the record [in United States v. Bethlehem
Bok Report, Report to the Chancellorfor 1982-83, at 3-8 (1983); Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes.- What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentiousand Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 51-59 (1983). See
also Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUDIES 359 (1978); Meyerson, Why There Are So Few Lawyers in Japan, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1981 at 14, col. 3
(Midwest ed.) (nonlawyers in Japan often perform the kind of work that lawyers perform
in the United States).
83. The German study concludes: "German legal ethics is adversarial ethics."
Luban, supra note 82, at 280. See also id. at 207 ("Ultimately, the lesson may be that no
system of procedural justice with a private bar can evade the paradox that underlies
adversarial ethics-the paradox deriving from the fact that the system of justice creates
its own antagonists.") (footnote omitted).
84. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 41.
85. Id. at 42.
86. Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs "Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions," and Rule 26(g), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governs "Signing of Discovery Requests, Responses, and Objections." Cf 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 (1982).
87. The present Bruce Bromley Professor of Law is Arthur R. Miller, who ironically,
teaches Civil Procedure. AALS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS: 1986-87 at 569-70
(1986).
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Steel, 315 U.S. 289 (1942)] you will see immediately the Bromley
protractor touch in the third line. Promptly after the answer was
filed I served quite a comprehensive set of interrogatories on the
Government. I said to myself, "That'll tie up brother Hansen
Chief] for a while," and I went about other
[the Antitrust
8s
business.
Of course the system should not tolerate unjustified delay and
frivolous motions. Litigation should be made less expensive, not
more so. Yet existing empirical research suggests that rules like
Federal Rule 11 compound the problem, not reduce it.
For example, Federal Judge Jack Weinstein has concluded:
"[Rule 11 has] become another way of harassing the opponent and
delaying the case. It's increased the tensions in litigation, and increased the amount of extra motions and extra appeals. To date,
the effects have been adverse."8 9 A systematic and thorough empirical study of Rule 11 satellite litigation supports Judge Weinstein's experience. That study showed that "there is a good deal of
interjudge disagreement over what actions constitute a violation of
the rule, only partial compliance with the desired objective standard, inaccurate and systematically biased normative assumptions
about other judges' willingness to impose sanctions, and a continued neglect of alternative, nonmonetary means of response.''90
Thus, Rule 11, in practice, tends to be arbitrary. As a factual matter, the study also demonstrated that, thus far, Rule 11 has become
primarily an anti-plaintiff tool used by defense counsel. 9 ' In various appellate court cases the courts have recently cut back on various abuses by trial judges, but these courts have also noted the
extra and unnecessary expense imposed on counsel and their clients out of all proportion to any perceived harm.9 2
88. Bromley, Judicial Control of Antitrust Cases, 23 F.R.D. 417, 420 (1958).
89. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986, at 30, 3 1. See also Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules
After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243, 244 (1984).
90. S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 1 I SANCTIONS 45 (Fed. Jud. Ctr.
1985). See also id. at xi.
91. Id. See generally Symposium, Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.-How Go The Best Laid Plans?,54 FORD. L. REV. 1-140 (1985); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986). See also Kaberon, Rule 11
Sanctions ChangingPracticein the Federal Courts, 133 Chi. Daily L. Bull. at 1 (Apr. 25,
1987) (Second Circuit study showed average award against plaintiff or plaintiff attorney is
$6,229; average award against defendant or defense attorney is $2,091).
92. See, e.g., Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1541 (9th
Cir. 1986); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Yagmans 796 F.2d
1165 (9th Cir. 1986). Cf. DAMASKA, A FOREIGN PERSPECTIVE ON THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL SYSTEM, IN STATE COURTS: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE 237, 240 (T.
Fetter ed. 1978) (increase in "companion litigation" spawned by procedural rules).
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One inherent problem in Rule 11 is that not everyone agrees
what is a frivolous issue. Often one judge's frivolity is another
judge's path-breaking decision.93 I have talked to a number of lawyers about this problem; they often know exactly what is a frivolous claim: it is something they do not do; it is something engaged
in by the opposing counsel.
I readily agree that some lawyers (defense counsel as well as
plaintiff counsel) file frivolous motions. I suspect that Judge Weinstein does not dispute the point. Yet we both agree that adding
another layer of motions and appeals is not the best way to simplify
litigation. Judges can and should report to the appropriate discipline boards lawyers who abuse the system.9 4 The Commission is
absolutely correct that too many lawyers and judges presently fail
to report. 9 More reporting would make frivolous motions most
costly, would not add an extra layer of expense to the litigative
process (because the complaints would be heard in a different forum), and would not share the anti-plaintiff bias exhibited in the
present system.
The ABA Professionalism Commission also complains that
RICO-the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act 96 -has been interpreted improperly. Thus, the legislative efforts have been "misdirected" by the courts.97 RICO provides for
treble damages for certain types of activities such as mail fraud and
securities fraud. Antitrust laws have provided for treble damages
for years. Why should those who practice fraud be put in a better
position than those who are antitrust violators-i.e., "catch me,
and I'll pay only what I owe"? Congress wanted to discourage
fraud, and granting plaintiffs treble damages and attorneys' fees
does exactly that.
I do not understand why the Commission singled out RICO,
and what RICO has to do with professionalism. I realize that
some commentators have argued that RICO should be interpreted
narrowly, reaching only organized crime.98 Yet the courts have
93. See, e.g., Hector v. INS, 782 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd per curiam, 107 S.
Ct. 379 (1986) (third circuit decision reversed in light of "plain language" of statute, the
plain meaning of which is "compelling"); Henderson v. United States, 784 F.2d 942, 94346 (9th Cir. 1986) (federal government liable in tort when trespassing adults scale electrical tower to steal cable and are accidentally electrocuted).
94. ABA, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 3B(3)(1978).
95. See Thode, The Code of Judicial Conduct-The First Five Years in the Courts,
1977 UTAH L. REv. 395, 401 (rare for lawyer or judge to file disciplinary complaint).
96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 and Supp. III 1985).
97. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 33.
98. See, e.g., id. at 71, n.104.
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disagreed, and rejected artificial limitations on the statute, 99 fulfilling the intent of Congress according to other commentators," °°
and Congress has refused to change the law.
I suppose that if we have too many lawsuits, we can cut down on
litigation by repealing laws like RICO, making it more difficult for
defrauded plaintiffs to be made whole. Certain defendants would
no doubt welcome that result, but I doubt that it would promote
professionalism.
I certainly agree with the Commission that we should do what
we can to cut delay in the courts, so that cases can proceed to trial
on the merits as quickly as possible. Yet we must be realistic.
When we have cases involving a great deal of money and complex
law, we should not be surprised that a just result takes time. That
is inherent in the system.
With that caveat, there are still some reforms that will help, at
least at the margin. Judges, of course, should promptly decide motions. And the judicial system should institute built-in mechanisms to discourage judges from accepting delay. Consider, for
example, the reduction in delay of criminal cases when the Southern District of New York changed from a central calendar system
to an individual calendar system. Under the central calendar system all criminal pretrial motions made in a given week were decided by one judge on a rotating basis. If a judge who was on
motion call that week continued a motion, he would not have to
decide it; it would merely be sent to the next judge who would, in
turn, either decide it or continue it and thereby pass it to another
judge. A judge was, in effect, rewarded for delay because the more
he or she granted postponements, the less was the judge's work
load. Under the individual calendar system, criminal cases are assigned almost immediately to a given judge for all purposes. No
longer did a jurist benefit from granting a requested continuance;
he kept the case until it was finally disposed. Under the individual
calendar system, unnecessary delay was significantly reduced, and
the number of guilty pleas increased.'' Nothing seems to en99.
100.

See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
See, e.g., Blakey, RICO: A Vital Weapon in the Battle Against CorporateFraud,

Chi. Daily L. Bull., Jan. 10, 1986, at 4, col. 5; Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1982); Blakey &

Gettings, RICO: Evening Up the Odds, 16 TRIAL 58 (Oct. 1980).
101. Rotunda, Law, Lawyers, and Managers, in THE ETHICS OF CORPORATE CONDUCT 144 (C. Walton 1977). A recent study of the administrative office of the United
States Courts showed that in the Eastern District of Virginia, where judges forced themselves to decide cases quickly, the time between the filing of the litigants' papers and the
start of the civil trial is only five months. The national median is fourteen months. In
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courage guilty pleas or civil settlements so much as the knowledge
that a trial date is set and will not be changed.
More institutional reforms are needed to assure that cases are
tried on the merits with the least delay. Roscoe Pound's complaint
over eighty years ago, that "our exaggerated contentious" civil
procedure "disfigures our judicial administration,"' 2 portended
the movement toward notice pleading. This movement from technical to simplified pleading in the federal rules was intended to reduce delay. °3 Unfortunately, the battle is not yet won. Various
judges-led by the Third Circuit-are reviving fact pleading in areas such as securities fraud, civil rights, and conspiracy. 1°4 For
example, a Third Circuit court has dismissed a civil rights complaint signed by the Attorney General of the United States alleging
that members of the Philadelphia police systematically violated the
civil rights of minorities by physical abuse. The trial court concluded that the suit could be vexatious for the police to defend; °5
while the appellate court did not find the claim frivolous, it nevertheless concluded that the complaint did not provide "fair notice." '0 6 The commentators and most judges agree that this effort
to reduce litigation by procedural rulings that prevent plaintiffs
from having their day in court is misguided. 0 7
some federal districts it is two years. Barrett, "Rocket Docket" Federal Courts in Virginia Dispense Speedy Justice, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1987, at 33, col. 4-6 (Midwest ed.).

102. See Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 395, 404-06 (1906).
103. J. FLEMING & G. HAZARD, Civil Procedure. Sec. 1.6 at 17 (3d ed. 1985) ("The
hardships, delays, and injustices finally led to reform.") See also Thomson v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 476 F.2dc 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1973); Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case, " 21
F.R.D. 45, 46 (1957). Cf ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 24.
104. See the thoughtful study by Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 449 (1986). See also id. at 435

(fact pleading "seems to be enjoying a revival in a number of areas ...
105.

.

United States v. Philadelphia, 482 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

106. 644 F.2d 187, 205-06 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Sims v. Faestal, 638 F.
Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (securities fraud suit against law firm of McDermott, Will &
Emery and others for knowingly failing to disclose material facts in offering memorandum dismissed on technical pleading grounds). Contra Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469
(5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (similar charges against another lawyer held to state a cause of
action).
107.

See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Felton v. Walston & Co.,

508 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1974); Thompson v. Allstate Insurance Co., 476 F.2d 746, 749
(5th Cir. 1973).
See also 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
9.03, at 9.28 (2d
ed. 1985); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1298, at
406 (1969). Clark, The Handmaidof Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 318-19 (1938); Marcus, The Revival of FactPleading Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM.
L. REV. 433 (1986).
In spite of the fact that Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure motions rarely
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Our own State of Illinois can learn from other procedural reforms that serve to move litigation along promptly without being
biased against either plaintiff or defendant. For example, judges
rather than lawyers can conduct the voir dire of the jurors. Federal
courts have been doing this for years without loss of any basic civil
rights. The whole process of jury selection can be streamlined,
thus saving the time of litigants and jurors.10 8 Remember that the
purpose of voir dire and jury selection is to assure that the jurors
are impartial; there is no public interest served by allowing parties
to use the opportunity to plead one's case to the jury or to select
jurors who are likely to favor one side or the other. Illinois might
also seek to simplify its other procedural rules: for example, it is
the only state in the Union to distinguish between two types of
depositions, creating unnecessary complexity." 9
Illinois also should look carefully at the rules of evidence and
procedure with an eye toward eliminating those that add to expense without adding to justice. For example, Illinois, unlike most
other states, requires parties to prove the information contained in
hospital records by calling all the nurses and doctors involved.,"
The business records exception to the hearsay rule does not apply
here. The process can be expensive and the benefits to the system
of justice are quite unclear.' I To engage in specific reform and
succeed, defense attorneys find them effective to slow down the litigation process. Cf. A.
MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 78 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1984) (Rule 12(b)(6) motions very rarely succeed). Requiring specificity
in pleadings inherently favors defendants, as one expert in civil procedure has noted.
Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 815 (1981).
108. See Graham & Pope, One Day, One Trial or a One Week Term of Jury Service:
The Misleading Marketing of Modern Jury Management Systems, 45 Mo. L. REV. 255
(1980). Illinois has recently established a Study Committee on Voir Dire. Professor
James P. Carey of Loyola University of Chicago is the Reporter.
See also Rickleff, Sentenced to the Jury Room, Wall St. J., June 5, 1987, at 18, col. 4-6
(Midwest ed.).
109. I am indebted to various members of the Illinois State Bar Association Committee on Professionalism, in particular, Peter Lousberg, Esq., for suggesting possible avenues of law reform.
110. See Wright v. Upson, 202 11. 120, 135 N.E.209 (1922). While it "is difficult to
believe that Wright continues to represent the state of admissibility of hospital records in
Illinois, the case continues to be applied by lower courts." E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM,
HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 803.11, at 444 (1979). See, e.g., Wilson v. Clark,
80 Ill. App. 3d 194, 399 N.E.2d 651 (1980). Cf. Estate of Buddeke, 49 Il. App. 3d 431,
364 N.E.2d 446 (1977).
111. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 312 (E. Cleary 1972). This conclusion-that the business records exception to the hearsay rule should not apply here-is
especially true in light of the Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of Federal Evidence Rule
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streamlining of our rules of evidence and procedure may not be
dramatic or exciting, but the cumulative efforts of the reform results should be satisfying.
IV.

LEGAL EDUCATION DURING AND AFTER LAW SCHOOL

I do not want to give the impression that I do not agree with any
of the proposals of the ABA Commission. On the contrary, much
of what it recommends deserves to be implemented. Thus, I would
like to turn to some of the Commission Recommendations dealing
with legal education, both during law school and while in practice.
Law schools, as the Commission recommends, should continue
to teach ethics courses as well as weave ethics issues into other
courses." 2 Law schools seem to be doing a good job now in training for the practice of law. The Commission does not specifically
703. See Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill.2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981). See also Melecosky v.
McCarthy Bros. Co., 115 Il. 2d 209, 503 N.E.2d 355 (1986).
112. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 16-17. The Commission also recommends that the ABA prepare videotapes on ethical problems or vignettes. Id. at 17 &
n*. If the ethical problems of the profession are even half as serious as the Commission
contends, having students watch video vignettes may not make much of a dent in the
problem; I have less faith than the Commission in the power of television. In any event,
the ABA prepared such videotapes and accompanying discussion guides a decade ago.
See ABA, DILEMMAS IN LEGAL ETHICS (PARTS 1-6) (ABA 1977). One might assume
that the Commission did not know of these videotapes, or found them inadequate; the
Commission members, however, were informed of the existence of this series, but the
Commission never viewed any of the videotapes.
The Commission also expressed concerns that the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), prepared by the National Conference of Bar Examiners
("NCBE"), "may unduly test only the lowest acceptable standards through technical responses to multiple choice questions." ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 17
(emphasis added). Leaving aside the ambiguous work "unduly," the fact remains that
the MPRE does in fact test ethical aspiration as well as conduct beyond the pale. Objective questions can certainly test whether a lawyer should or must, or may do something.
Moreover, I do not regard questions testing the parameters of the attorney-client privilege, or the rules governing commingling of client trust funds, or conflict of interest restrictions as "technical." One knowledgeable commentator on bar examinations has
noted that it is a "false assumption" that objective examinations only test "the ability to
memorize facts or find a question hidden within a convoluted passage." Josephson, Becoming a Lawyer.- An Outsider's View, 53 THE BAR EXAMINER 4, 10 (May 1984).
The Commission urges the NCBE to prepare essay questions to test ethics issues.
ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 18. My own experience as an educator is
that law students who know anything about testing techniques often respond to essay
questions on ethics by writing, in substance: "the conduct of X raises some ethical questions that I would avoid by withdrawing from the case." See also Morrissey, The Origins
and Objectives of the MPRE, 50 THE BAR EXAMINER 24, 25 (Aug. 1981) ("Essay questions on ethics tend to invoke sanctimonious answers, which in no way indicate how
candidates would respond to a similar situation when actually practicing law.").
I am not saying that good essay questions can't be drafted. I'd like to think that I have
drafted some. I only point out that essay questions have their own pitfalls. One expert
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reach this conclusion, but it acknowledges the evidence that demonstrates that older lawyers - not younger lawyers who have just
finished law school, but older lawyers, those out ten years or more
1 13
draw a very disproportionate number of the malpractice suits.
The Commission recognizes what too many people forget: legal
education does not end on graduation day. The good lawyer is
always learning. The law changes. The tools of the legal profession change. The only thing that is constant is the certainty of
change. In order to increase the competence of those older lawyers
who have not kept up with change, and to reduce the number of
malpractice suits against such lawyers, the Commission recommends that lawyers should take continuing legal education
courses. 1 4 Lawyers often oppose making these courses
mandatory, arguing that some lawyers may be physically present
but mentally in a different world. The Commission's response is to
recommend that continuing legal education should be mandatory
with an examination on the materials taught!" 5 It will be interesting to see how the organized bar reacts to that suggestion.
Even if the bar is not yet willing to accept mandatory continuing
legal education ("CLE") with periodic examinations on the courses
taken, the bar should seriously consider mandatory continuing
legal education in the area of legal ethics. Attorneys practicing
bankruptcy law, for example, may have a market incentive to keep
up in the law involving creditor rights, or to take CLE courses in
that area. But they do not have the same incentive to learn about
recent developments regarding client trust funds, conflict of interests, and attorney disqualification. Lawyers often are their own
worst lawyers; they often do not appreciate the nuances of the "law
of lawyering. ' "116 If they did, they (and their clients) would benefit.

The Commission properly recognizes that even though lawyers
on bar testing and bar techniques has conceded that "[t]here are certain inherent and
irreducible reliability problems engendered by essay testing." Josephson, supra, at 12.
We must remember that the purpose of the MPRE is not to separate the A students
from the B students or C students. That is the purpose of examinations during the course
of three years of law school. Nor is it the purpose of the MPRE to create yet another
barrier to entry. And the MPRE does not guarantee that the future lawyers will in fact
be ethical any more than an examination on antitrust will guarantee that those who will
pass will never engage in price fixing. Rather, the purpose of the MPRE is to separate
those who know their ethical responsibilities and aspirations from the ethically incompetent. An objective examination serves that limited goal quite satisfactorily.
113. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 24 n.*. See, e.g., Gates, The Newest Data on Lawyers' Malpractice Claims, 70 A.B.A. J. 78 (April 1984).
114. ABA COMMISSION REPORT at supra note 5, at 24.
115. Id.
116. See Rotunda, Ethical Problems in Federal Agency Hiring of Private Attorneys, I
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are educated about, and sensitized to, ethical issues that may develop in their law practice, they nevertheless may not have the distance to resolve the problems properly. The lawyers involved may
be too close to the issue to be objective. Thus the Commission
urges law firms to establish ethics committees."17 I know of vari-

ous firms that already have done that. Such ethics committees
should provide a more neutral, detached source of advice for the
supervising partner or the associates being supervised.
Let me conclude by briefly considering two more areas where
the Commission has suggested reform." 8 The first involves judges;
the second, the problem of admission and discipline.
V.

JUDGES

The Commission strongly endorsed the merit selection of
judges." 9 The Deans of every law school in this state also have
supported merit selection for years. About forty states already
have some form of merit
selection; Illinois, which does not, is in
20
the distinct minority.1

As the ABA Commission acknowledges, the "elective system
has given us some very good judges ... 121 Yet we do not value a

chain by its strongest links but by its weakest. The present elective
system has given us some weak links. The recent Greylord investigation, which has unfairly tarred the many honest and capable
judges in Illinois, has served to focus our attention on the issue.
The investigation of the ABA Commission led it to conclude
that judges who are appointed will be less reluctant to punish lawyers misconduct than judges who need to face retention elections
periodically, and who need campaign donations. And, the Commission added, the political gauntlet discourages "many of the best
12 2
potential candidates" from applying.

To these reasons, let me add another. The average citizen-indeed, the average lawyer-often does not know enough about the
GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 85, 96-102, 122-23 (1987). See also G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN
THE PRACTICE OF LAW 43-44 (1976).
117. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 23.

118. The Commission also recommends that, in order to reduce legal costs, paralegals be licensed to perform certain relatively simply tasks now being performed by lawyers. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 52. The proposal has merit. The bar
traditionally has been very protective of its legal monopoly, and its reaction to this proposal will be interesting.
119. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 43.
120. See, e.g., Push for Merit Selection, BAR LEADER 4 (Mar.-Apr. 1987).
121. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra, note 5, at 44.
122. Id.
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individual candidates to make an informed choice. The truth of
this statement was dramatically illustrated by the recent situation
in Illinois, where the Chicago Bar Association rated as "qualified"
a judicial candidate who won election to the Cook County Circuit
Court Bench; this lawyer already had been identified as having
paid bribes in traffic court. He later pled guilty to bribery charges,
was prohibited from taking his judicial seat, and was then disbarred from the practice of law. 123
This example is not isolated. Justin Stanley, the Chairperson of
the Professionalism Commission, and a distinguished Chicago attorney who formerly served as ABA President, conceded that at
the recent Chicago elections there were few judicial candidates
"that I knew and I have been practicing here a long time, and I
found talking to friends that most of them haven't any idea what to
do under those circumstances."1 24 If Justin Stanley does not feel
competent to vote knowledgeably for judicial candidates, how will
the average lay voter fare? Popular judges are more likely to be
elected or retained, but popular judges are not necessarily the better ones. Sir Francis Bacon's advice offered many years ago still
thing, and plaudits
contains truth: "A popular judge is a deformed
125
magistrates."'
for
than
players
are fitter for
The Illinois Supreme Court recently promulgated a new Code of
27
Judicial Conduct. 126 It is patterned after the ABA Model Code,1
and goes a long way toward improving and clarifying the ethics
123. Push for Merit Selection Gains Momentum, BAR LEADER 4 (Mar.-Apr. 1987).
Other states without merit selection have had similar problems:
In Philadelphia, two judges were indicted for extortion as part of a federal
grand jury investigation of bribes from a union to judges and other government
officials.
In the wake of allegations about improper campaign contributions to justices
of the Texas Supreme Court, a court committee was formed to push for merit
selection.
A hotly contested race in the North Carolina Supreme Court rekindled professional and public interest in merit selection.
Id.
124. Professionals,Pragmatistsor Predators?,75 ILL. B.J. 482 (R. Rotunda ed. 1987)
(quoting J. Stanley, chair, ABA Commission on Professionalism). Jerold Solovy, Chair
of a Special Commission on the Administration of Justice in Cook County-a Commission formed to study court improvements after Greylord-stated: "The political process
can't be relied upon to choose capable judges." Push for Merit Selection Gains Momentum, BAR LEADER 4 (Mar.-Apr. 1987).
125. W. H. AUDEN & L. KRONENBERGER, THE VIKING BOOK OF APHORISMS 208
(1966).
126. See 17 BENCH & BAR 1-4 (I.S.B.A., No. 7, Jan. 1987).
127. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, reprinted in T. MORGAN & R.
ROTUNDA, 1987 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 337 (Foundation Press 1987).
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guidelines for judges. While it attempts to regulate more strictly
the political campaign process, 11 8 the fact remains that as long as
Illinois judges are elected, you cannot take the politics out of politics. The29 time is ripe to consider some form of appointive
process. 1
I will make only one further comment on the new Illinois judicial code. Illinois Canon 2 adopts the black letter of ABA Model
Canon 2, and the two paragraphs of the Illinois Commentary are
virtually identical to the first two paragraphs of the ABA Commentary. Without explanation, however, Illinois ignores the third
paragraph of the ABA Commentary. That paragraph states explicitly, "It is inappropriate for a judge to hold membership in any
organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, religion, or national origin. Membership of a judge in an
organization that practices invidious discrimination may give rise
to perceptions by minorities, women, and others, that the judge's
impartiality is impaired ... ."13o Illinois offers no explanation for
the deletion of this paragraph, which may lead one to conclude
that the Illinois Supreme Court meant to approve of membership
in organizations which practice invidious discrimination. It is unusual for the judiciary (particularly an elected one) to embrace
membership in these organizations; certainly such membership can
hardly promote judicial professionalism.
128.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 7, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A,
7 (1985).
Note also that the new Illinois Judicial Code does not mandate judges to report lawyer
misconduct. At first blush, Illinois Canon 3B(3) appears to be a bit stronger than the
ABA version. The ABA Code provides that a judge "should" initiate disciplinary
charges against a judge or lawyer if the judge becomes aware of unprofessional conduct.
Illinois Canon B(3) substitutes the verb "shall." These changes are very good. What the
right hand giveth, however, the left hand may taketh away, for the Illinois commentary
suggests that a judge's finding of contempt against an attorney may be sufficient to fulfill
the judge's obligations. The problem with that suggestion is that a lawyer may be held in
contempt by several different judges; unless the judges report the contempt to the ARDC,
no central body will even know that a particular lawyer is frequently in trouble. Even the
judges who place that lawyer in contempt may not know of the contempt findings by
other judges. No one likes to whistle blow, but that may be the cost of a profession which
purports to be self-regulating. Cf.In re Laurie, 84 I11.
Courts Commission 5 (May 15,
1985).
129. For example, the law could provide for appointment by the Governor to a ten
year term, with a presumption of reappointment.
130. Added Aug. 7, 1984, by the ABA House of Delegates, meeting in Chicago, reCANON
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ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND LEGAL DISCIPLINE

I would like to conclude with a discussion of several case histories that illustrate the problems in admission to the Bar and legal
discipline. They are all, unfortunately, very true.
First, admission to the bar. Every year our Dean, like the deans
of all law schools, writes a report to the Illinois Bar Admission
Authorities. In the standard form, the Dean is asked whether he
would or would not recommend the graduate "for a position of
trust and confidence." 3 ' The form also asks whether our records
show information adversely reflecting on the candidate's honesty,
integrity, general conduct, reputation, and character.
In two recent cases our Dean at Illinois has not recommended
two candidates. We had evidence of misrepresentation, forgery,
and mental instability as well as other defects of character, all occurring during the applicants' law school careers. These charges
are serious. The Dean attached to his nonrecommendation a narrative discussing the candidates' problems.' 3 2 To that narrative,
the Dean attached extensive supporting documentation. Campus
legal counsel also was involved.
What happened? Nothing. The Admission Authorities neither
asked for, nor received, any new evidence. They conducted no investigation. The documentary evidence already submitted was apparently ignored. The Admission Authorities offered us no reason
for their nonaction. They admitted both candidates to the Illinois
Bar. One of these candidates-now a full-fledged member of the
bar-has since been caught in another matter involving
misrepresentation.
We investigated the admission process and were told that in
Cook County, at two different steps in the admission process, one
person can unilaterally decide to drop the investigation. The initial
reviewer need not even be a lawyer. The ethics admission process
in Illinois is not so much a hurdle as a vacuum-it sucks in almost
all applicants, regardless of documentary evidence of mental instability and misrepresentation. Law students appreciate this fact.
Several have told me that they have heard that if one seeks admis131.

See

STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, STATE OF ILLINOIS, CERTIFICATE OF

DEAN OF LAW SCHOOL.

132. The ABA Commission correctly criticizes law deans who "plea bargain"; in
such cases, the dean fails to report the discipline to the bar authorities as the quid pro quo
for the student's acceptance of sanctions. ABA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at
20, 65 n.67. The University of Illinois does not engage in this practice.
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sion to the Illinois Bar, seek it in crowded Cook County where any
ethics investigation is cursory or non-existent.
By way of comparison, we had another problem recently involving a misrepresentation by a law graduate who sought admission to
the Pennsylvania Bar. Our Dean fully disclosed the law student's
misrepresentation and then explained why, in his view, the nature
of the misrepresentation was such that it should not bar admission.
Armed with these facts, the Pennsylvania authorities conducted a
thorough investigation. They ultimately concluded that they
would agree with our Dean and admit the applicant. Their conclusion was a proper one; one of the reasons it was proper was that it
was reached after investigation. Pennsylvania investigates; Illinois
ignores.
When the Dean of the student's law school refuses to recommend someone for admission to the Bar, on grounds of mental instability and documentary evidence of misrepresentation, that
alone should trigger some investigation. I am not talking about
refusing admission because the applicant holds unpopular political
views; I am talking about misrepresentation. The state has a responsibility to future clients and to the system of justice. Illinois
can do more to protect the users of legal services. When Georgia
instituted a policy of fingerprinting applicants, about one-hundred
applicants withdrew their applications. 13 3 We can learn something
from the Georgia experience.
One last story, this one concerning discipline. About a year ago,
several partners of a law firm asked my advice. They had discovered that one of their partners had commingled client funds, had
misappropriated client money, and was being sued in various cases
filed throughout the state for malpractice because he had missed
statutes of limitations.
The lawyer apparently was under a great deal of stress and perhaps had mental or emotional problems. The partners asked the
wayward attorney to leave the firm, and he did. He also promptly
set up practice elsewhere in Illinois. The partners came to me for
legal advice; they wanted to know whether they had an obligation
to report the lawyer to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission ("ARDC"). I advised them that they must;
133. Estes, Bar Administration: One Men's View, 53 THE BAR EXAMINER 19, 20
(Aug. 1984): "All applicants [to the Georgia bar] were notified of this requirement [for
the submission of fingerprints] and upwards of one-hundred applications were abandoned." See also Custer, Georgia's Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants, 51 THE
BAR EXAMINER 17 (Aug. 1982).
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that if they did not, it was unlikely that they would ever be disciplined because it is very rare that an attorney is disciplined for
refusing to whistle-blow. But, I concluded, the attorneys really
should whistle-blow. The wayward lawyer was still out there, still
practicing law, potentially causing new harm. To whistle-blow was
the moral thing to do, even though they would never be caught for
failing to report.
I am reminded of an episode from Don Quixote: Don Quixote is
with Sancho Panza, his squire. Quixote explains that he must now
stay up all night and think about his love, Dulcinea, because
Knights-Errant are supposed to do that. "But, M'Lord," says
Sancho Panza, "I will be asleep and I won't know if you fail to stay
up all night. And we are in the middle of the plains. No one else is
here, so no one else will ever know." "I will know," says Quixote.
I don't mean to suggest that, like Don Quixote, we should tilt at
windmills. But what you do when you believe that no one will ever
catch you is the real test of ethics.
The lawyers did the right thing. They reported the wayward
attorney to the ARDC. They wrote a careful, objective narrative.
They offered to provide documentary proof. The response of the
ARDC? At first, the ARDC asked the reporting lawyers if the
ARDC could undertake this matter as a complaint by the Administrator. The lawyers agreed. After that, the ARDC never contacted the complaining lawyer to seek documents or for any
further information from them. When the lawyers phoned ARDC,
the ARDC representative refused to answer any questions or give
any indication of the progress or disposition of the matter. We
eventually learned that the ARDC took no disciplinary action
against the wayward lawyer.
Within two years, the wayward attorney moved to Arizona, and
applied for admission to the bar there. The application asked him
to list his prior employment record. He did. The Arizona authorities sent a routine letter to my clients. The form questionnaire
asked the standard question: "Would you rehire the applicant?"
The wayward attorney's former law partners truthfully answered:
"No, for the reasons stated in our letter to the ARDC .... " They
did not attach the ARDC letter. Nonetheless, the Arizona authorities immediately began an investigation. They sent a lawyer to
Illinois to depose my clients, who were the wayward attorney's former partners. The wayward attorney also sent his own lawyer.
The deposition lasted all day.
Afterwards, the Arizona bar attorney told my clients that, at
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Arizona's request, the Illinois ARDC had shown the Arizona bar
attorneys its file on the wayward lawyer. Based on that file alone,
said the Arizona discipline attorney, he could not understand why
the ARDC closed the case. Shortly thereafter, the wayward attorney, at the suggestion of his own counsel, underwent a psychiatric
evaluation. It concluded that he was not fit to practice law. The
wayward lawyer withdrew his Arizona application, underwent
counseling, and plans to resubmit the application when he has his
problems truly behind him. I am hopeful that he will eventually be
readmitted to the practice of law when he has reformed and is capable of handling client matters competently, ethically, and
honestly.
The point of the story: Arizona investigated; Illinois did not.
Perhaps the ARDC closed the case because the wayward lawyer
was moving out of state. If so, the reason is outrageous. We
should not impose on our sister states those lawyers who are unfit
to practice. We would not like Arizona shipping us their incompetent, unethical, and alcoholic lawyers to practice here. Whatever
the reason for the ARDC decision-lack of manpower, or lack of
will-it should be corrected.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Report of the ABA Commission on Professionalism is a
very important document because it focuses our attention on the
ways of improving the legal profession. I do not endorse all of its
proposals, but I applaud the effort it represents. Hopefully, some
of its suggestions will be implemented. Yet if the Commission's
Report does nothing other than promote further discussion on the
ways to improve the practice of law, it will have served a very important role.
Carl Sandburg wrote years ago:
The knack of a mason outlasts a moon.
The hands of a plasterer hold a room together,
The land of a farmer wishes him back again.
Singers of songs and dreamers of plays
Build a house no wind blows over.
The lawyers-tell me why a hearse horse snickers
hauling a lawyer's bones. '34
But why should we pay attention to what horses think? I much
prefer the view expressed by John W. Davis many years ago:
134. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: OF OUR LAW AND
(1960) (quoting Carl Sandburg, The Lawyers Know Too Much (1951)).
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True, we build no bridges. We raise no towers. We construct no
engines. We paint no pictures-unless as amateurs for our own
principal amusement. There is little of all that we do which the
eye of man can see. But we smooth out difficulties; we relieve
stress; we correct mistakes; we take up other men's burdens and
by our effort
we make possible the peaceful life of men in a peace35
ful state.

135.

Quoted in

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

(1958), and in M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 3 (1967).
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